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Abstract
This paper develops a typology of welfare services and attempts to
illustrate its use in clarifying discussions about the privatisation of
welfare and in analysing changes in expenditure. A third dimension,
which concerns the extent of the consumer’s decision-making power and
turns on the question of agency and exit, is added to the now-familiar
dimensions of provision and finance. This third dimension is found to
have been increasingly important in policy terms, as attempts have been
made to reduce the role of the “pure public” sector. The assisted places
scheme, NHS glasses vouchers, and tax relief on pension contributions
are all examples of policies which sought to promote consumer decision-
making. However despite the policy interest in moving from public to
private decision, the second half of the paper shows that the impact in
terms of changes in patterns of welfare expenditure since 1979/80 has
been small. The overall picture is one of continuing importance of the
publicly provided, financed and decided sector, accounting for just over
half of all welfare expenditure in 1979/80 and just under half in 1995/96.
11. Introduction
Since the days of the Poor Law, it has been accepted that the state has
some role to play in the provision of welfare. But appropriate limits to
state involvement have been the subject of continual debate: on the one
hand, it has been argued that state provision undermines family and
individual responsibility, limits choice and stifles private enterprise,
while on the other hand, private or informal provision has been accused
of being inadequate, inefficient and inequitable. In recent years, the
argument has turned on the question of finance - a growing realisation
across political parties that if welfare services are to be sustained at their
current level, either taxes will have to rise or alternative methods of
funding will have to be sought.
These on-going debates have led to changes in policy and a
complex mix of public, private and informal welfare provision. Nor have
the divisions between the sectors remained clear-cut: since 1979, new
ways have been sought of harnessing the advantages of the private
sector whilst retaining some state finance or public control. In particular,
incentive structures have been altered in an attempt to galvanise both
state and private supply.
This paper proposes a typology of welfare services which may
help in making sense of changing patterns of provision. It identifies
three dimensions of “private welfare”, provision, finance and decision,
each of which may operate independently of the others. The second part
of the paper uses the typology to chart changes in the relative sizes of
public and private welfare sectors between 1979/80 and 1995/96 and
presents an overview of policies which have affected, or sought to affect,
boundaries between them.
2. A Typology of Private and Public Welfare Services
One- and two-dimensional approaches
Simplistically, welfare can be divided into a dominant and monolithic
state sector with a residual ‘private’ category including anything that is
not directly provided by the state or is not tax-funded (Chart 1).
However this can neither capture the complexity of modern welfare
provision, nor is it historically accurate. Papadakis and Taylor-Gooby
(1987) identify five phases in the development of the welfare state from
1800 onwards, and in none of these could welfare be represented
2sensibly with a single public/private split. Up to around 1870, state
intervention in welfare largely took the form of regulation, and although
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the state became
increasingly involved in direct provision of services (for example
primary education and housing), it still supported private and charitable
forms of provision. Self-help through Friendly Societies and the Trade
Union movement was a major source of support in sickness and old age,
at least for some sections of population. The inter-war years were
characterised by a further expansion of state activity but a simultaneous
growth in home ownership and occupational pensions. It was only with
the establishment of the National Health Service and the boom in
council house building that state welfare could really be said to become
dominant. Even then, other forms of welfare continued to co-exist, as
Titmuss, writing in 1958, made clear: the ‘divisions of welfare’ included
occupational welfare, informal care, tax reliefs, and services provided by
voluntary and private organisations.
In the present era, we have experienced a much-heralded ‘crisis’ in
the welfare state, with ways being sought to limit direct public
involvement. This has included promoting a distinction between
providers and the purchasers, such that a public body may decide to
purchase a private service (for example, contracted-out hospital
catering), and private individuals may pay for publicly-run services (for
example, pay-beds in NHS hospitals).
A more sophisticated approach than a simple public/private
classification is therefore necessary if we want to reflect actual welfare
provision. The theoretical distinction between purchase and provision
began to be made as early as 1968 (Peacock, Glennerster and Lavers) and
became standard in the 1980s. This two-dimensional split allows for
state purchases of private services, and private purchases of public
services, as well as the more traditional all-public and all-private sectors
(Glennerster, 1992). In Chart 2, everything in the top semi-circle is
publicly provided, and everything in the bottom semi-circle is privately
provided, but there is also a left-right split, with the right-hand semi-
circle representing publicly-purchased services, and the left, privately-
purchased services. The quadrant at top right is the overlap between
public provision and public purchase, and the quadrant at bottom left is
the overlap between private provision and private purchase.
3A third dimension - ‘decision’
This is often where categorisation stops. But some recent developments
in welfare services are not readily placed in the chart as it stands, for
example, the now-defunct nursery voucher scheme. A private nursery
place purchased by a parent with a voucher is provided privately, so it
should clearly be in the bottom semi-circle, but although the
government provides the money (public purchase: right half), the place
is chosen by the parent (private purchase: left half).  There are other
cases where it appears that selection of the service has been
“privatised”, i.e. handed to the consumer, whilst the state retains
responsibility for finance and possibly also for provision.1 For this
reason, a third dimension may be helpful, splitting “purchase” into
“finance” and “decision”.
This is illustrated in Chart 3. The inner circle represents services
which are ‘publicly decided’ (in a sense elaborated below) and the outer
ring represents services where an individual has decision-making
power. As in the previous chart, anything in the top semi-circle is
publicly provided (whether in the inner circle or the outer ring), and
anything in the right half is publicly financed.
The distinction between public and private decision-making
power is a fuzzy one: the difference between services in the outer ring
and inner circle is a matter of degree and the sharpness of the lines
between them are for the sake of presentational clarity rather than
representational accuracy. Nevertheless, the ‘decision’ dimension does
pick up an important feature of welfare provision which is obscured in
two-dimensional approaches.
The degree of decision-making power which consumers have is
determined firstly by how directly they choose the service, and secondly
on the extent to which there are viable alternatives. Choosing a service
involves selecting the provider and/or the level of service received. The
directness of an individual’s choice of service depends on whether he or
she is able to choose for themselves or only via an agent or third party.
For example, NHS patients who need hospital treatment have only
indirect control over the service they will receive since it is their local
Health Authority (or, in the case of fund-holding practices, their GP)
who contract on their behalf with the hospital to provide treatment. On
the other hand, someone who goes to the optician is in a position to
choose a pair of glasses for him or herself, even if the purchase is state-
                                               
1 Throughout, the term “consumer” is treated as synonymous with “client” and “user”.
4financed (through an NHS voucher). This first part of decision-making
power therefore turns on the question of agency. There are borderline
cases, for example advocacy arrangements or directly-instructed agents,
but in general a consumer will be said to have direct choice only if the
service contract is between the consumer and the provider, with no
intermediaries.
The second part of decision-making power depends on the
existence of viable alternatives, or, in Hirschmann’s (1970) terminology,
the possibility of exit. If there is a range of services offering a range of
qualities and prices, and consumers are free to choose between them,
they can express their dissatisfaction with the service offered by one
provider by switching to another. However for ‘exit’ to be a realistic
possibility, the alternatives must be, firstly, known and available to the
individual concerned, and secondly, reasonably similar to the rejected
option in terms of quality and cost to the consumer.
Availability may be restricted by eligibility conditions imposed by
the provider, by geographical location, or by other access barriers. Huge
discontinuities in price or quality will mean high costs are incurred by
shifting provider and will act as a disincentive. For example, parents
who are unhappy with the local state school theoretically have the
option of sending their children to private school, but the difference in
cost is so large that for most it is not a practical possibility. For there to
be genuine choice, it must be possible to gain a little in quality (possibly
for a slightly higher price) by switching provider; alternatives which are
too far apart in terms of either quality or price do not constitute ‘viable’
alternatives in this sense. In technical terms, marginal trades must be
possible.
So for “decision” to be considered private (i.e. outer ring in Chart
3), there must be a range of services available to the consumer which are
close in terms of price and quality, and the choice of service must be
made directly by the consumer. For it to be considered public (i.e. inner
circle), either there must be agents acting on behalf of consumers, or
decisions on level of service and identity of provider are made by a
public body rather than individual consumers.
It needs to be emphasised that public/private decision is not a
clear-cut distinction. On the one hand, consumers may be able to
exercise some control over services like Local Education Authority
schools which appear to be governed by decisions made by public
bodies. Parents may not have a realistic option of taking their custom
5elsewhere, but they can express their preferences directly, individually
or collectively, via the Parents Teachers Association, the Governing
Body or the LEA. In  Hirschmann’s terminology, this is the exercise of
voice. The extent to which ‘voice’ is effective depends on the structure of
the organisation - the greater the degree of democratic control, the more
likely ‘voice’ is to be influential - and on the number of people saying
the same thing. In the limit, consumers can have as much or even more
decision-making power in an organisation which is responsive to
preferences expressed through ‘voice’, as they can in a market governed
by ‘exit’. On the other hand, choices made by consumers in a
supposedly ‘free’ market can be severely constrained, by the narrow
range of services on offer, by eligibility restrictions, imperfect
information or budget constraints. So apparently paradigm cases of
‘public’ and ‘private’ decision may turn out to be closer than at first
seemed.
This typology is not intended to imply any value judgement about
the desirability of a service being located in the inner circle or outer ring.
Whilst it may in general be considered preferable to give consumers
choice over services they use, information problems, equity objectives
and the need for rationing may mitigate against that. Furthermore, ‘exit’
can be a crude way of indicating preferences, while ‘voice’ may be more
direct. In practice the way a service is delivered - private or public
decision, provision and finance - may be more a product of political
dogma than of an assessment of relative efficiency or equity. The
development of private alternatives to public welfare is looked at in the
second part of the paper, but first the other two dimensions - provision
and finance - need to be defined in a little more detail.
Provision and finance
Whether the provider is private sector or not depends on the degree to
which the organisation is owned and controlled independently of
Government. At one extreme, government departments and local
authorities are easy to classify as “public”, and at the other, commercial
companies are clearly “private”, but that leaves a large number of
welfare-providing organisations - quangos, voluntary organisations and
individuals - inbetween.
Moreover, all welfare providers are subject to regulation to a
greater or lesser extent. Indeed Le Grand (1997) suggests regulation is in
itself an important mechanism for providing welfare. Field (1995)
6advocates the use of organisations at arms-length from government to
run second-tier pensions but the terms and conditions under which they
would operate would be subject to specific legislation, and their
performance to public scrutiny. At what point should they be
considered public organisations?
Difficult cases include Housing Associations, which are voluntary
organisations operating under the auspices of the Housing Corporation,
itself a government agency; universities, which are generally considered
to be state institutions, but are independently owned and governed; and
GPs and dentists, who are commonly held to be part of the NHS, and, by
implication, the state sector, but are in fact self-employed contractors to
the NHS.
The National Accounts (CSO, 1996) treat government agencies and
public corporations as public sector, and assign both “non-profit-making
bodies serving persons” (including Housing Associations and
universities), and “unincorporated businesses” (including GPs and
dentists), to the personal sector. This classification has the advantage of
providing a comprehensive list and I therefore follow it in this paper.2
The non-public sector therefore consists of the self-employed,
profit-making companies which are not subject to detailed financial
control by government, and non-profit-making non-governmental
organisations such as charities, voluntary organisations, housing
associations, mutuals and friendly societies. For convenience, this is
sometimes referred to below as “private provision”, although it is
recognised that not-for-profit organisations form an important part of
the non-public sector.
A service may be financed in two basic ways. The first is that
taxpayers pay through general taxation (national or local) or ear-marked
taxes such as National Insurance Contributions (NICs). This is public or
state finance; an example of state-financed welfare is the basic state
pension. Taxes and most NICs are compulsory, bear some relation to
income or ability to pay, and are often payable by those who do not use
the service as well as those who do. The second possibility is that
consumers pay for the service directly, in which case it is a privately
financed service. Only those who use the service pay for it, and use of
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removed by direct intervention of the Secretary of State if the school is held to be performing
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7the service is generally not compulsory. An example would be a home
help paid for by the recipient.
Some finance is not immediately classifiable. Benefits paid for by
employers - such as corporate private medical insurance - may seem to
be neither public nor private. But at least in theory, any benefits
provided by employers for employees are in lieu of wages and hence
should be counted as privately financed. Finance by trusts, and charities,
for example, educational scholarships, can also be allocated to private
finance on the grounds that their origins are probably private donations.
Tax reliefs and allowances are a form of public finance in so far as
they are in lieu of public expenditure. The effect of a relief is nominally
the same as if the Inland Revenue had collected the money as taxes and
the government had redistributed it back to the same people as a benefit.
Transfers under the Child Support Agency present an interesting
problem. They do not appear as a state expenditure in the national
accounts, yet they are compulsory payments, enforced by the state and
which bear some relation to ability to pay. They look very much like a
tax hypothecated on being an absent parent, especially when we
consider that their main effect is to reduce the (tax-funded) social
security expenditure on lone parents.
Funds raised by the Private Finance Initiative are private in the
short-term (loaned by profit-making companies), but public in the
longer-term (paid back through higher tax rates). They can therefore be
seen as deferred taxation, and despite their name, belong in public
finance.
Finally, many services are financed in part by the state and in part
by the consumer. This is often the case where user-charges are imposed,
or where there is tax relief for a particular type of private expenditure –
these parts are separated, in so far as is possible, in the Charts which
follow.
Wheels of welfare
Returning to Chart 3, the white sector represents “pure public” welfare -
publicly provided, financed and determined. This includes traditional
welfare like unemployment benefit, but also includes services operating
in quasi-markets, since in such markets consumers do not act directly
but through an agent (their GP or Health Authority).
The black sector represents the other extreme - “pure private”,
where individual consumers, using their own money, buy a service from
8a private organisation. Individually-purchased Private Medical
Insurance is an example. In theory, services in this slice operate in a free
market, although in practice there are likely to be information problems,
supply-side constraints, and state regulation.
The primary colours - red, yellow and blue - represent cases where
public involvement is limited to one of the three dimensions. The red
sector is for public provision, with private finance and private decision.
If someone chose to buy a service from a public organisation - like an
NHS pay-bed - that would come into this sector.
The yellow sector is for public finance, with private provision and
private decision. This occurs where the state provides individuals with
the means to buy services from the private sector, for example through
vouchers, grants or tax-reliefs. NHS glasses are now provided in this
way with vouchers which can be spent at private opticians.
The blue sector is for public decision, with private provision and
finance. This is where an individual pays directly for a privately-
provided service, but differs from the black (all private) sector, in that
the individual does not have full decision-making power. This might
arise where an agent selects the service on behalf of the consumer - for
example, a care manager who puts together a package of services for her
elderly client including some privately-provided meals-on-wheels, for
which a charge is made. A privately-provided and financed service
‘chosen’ directly by the consumer but where alternative services are
limited or non-existent (such that the consumer does not have significant
power of exit) would also be classified in this sector.
The remaining sectors are combinations of primary colours.
Orange is red and yellow, i.e. public provision and public finance. This
sector differs from the white sector adjacent to it on the inner circle only
in that the decision has been passed to the consumer. SERPS, the state
second-tier pension scheme, is an example: employees may opt out of
SERPS by means of either an occupational pension or a personal
pension, so that although the state insists the individual must make
some pension contributions when employed, he or she is allowed to
choose the pension provider.
Green is yellow and blue, i.e. public finance and public decision,
but private provision. This differs from the white slice above it in that
the state is using a private organisation to provide the service - often
known as contracting-out. The public organisation - for example, a
9health authority - chooses a private organisation to carry out a service,
like hospital cleaning, and provides the finance for them to do so.
Finally, the purple sector - red and blue, public provision and
public decision - is for cases where individual consumers provide the
finance but the state provides and decides on the service. Charges for
prescriptions are an example. The purple sector differs from the white
sector in that the finance comes directly from users, rather than through
taxation.
It is possible to classify welfare services in any number of different
ways. Another candidate for the “third dimension”, for example, would
be regulation. It has been argued that the degree to which welfare
objectives are achieved through regulation of markets and individuals’
behaviour is on the increase (Le Grand,1997), and regulation can clearly
have a profound affect on the way in which a service is delivered.
However it is less clear that regulation constitutes a dimension which is
independent of provision and finance. Regulation itself is almost
invariably public; even where a private industry is self-regulating, this is
usually backed up by legally enforceable obligations. So the range of the
dimension would presumably be more-less rather than public-private.
But in that case “regulation” has already been incorporated into the
“provision” dimension, since the classification of the provider is
determined by the “degree to which it is owned and controlled
independently of Government”. A tightly regulated organisation, like an
NHS Trust, is more likely to be considered to be public than private.
Regulation may affect the finance dimension too, as in the case of rent
controls. The “fair rent” legislation, in so far as it was an alternative to
Housing Benefit, could be considered as public finance for private
provision.
To avoid the charge of needlessly adding to an already large set of
typologies, an addition must justify itself on the grounds of conceptual
clarity and explanatory power. It is hoped that the one proposed here
can help us to understand welfare policy in two ways. Firstly, we can
see how different mechanisms which are used to deliver welfare are
related. The inner ring on Chart 3 shows how services may be delivered
where agents acting on behalf of consumers, or decisions on level of
service and identity of provider are made by a public body rather than
individual consumers, may be delivered. Publicly-decided services may
be contracted-out (bottom half), or not. If contracted out, they may be
paid for by the state (right-hand) or through user-charges (left-hand).
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Similarly, services provided directly by the state may incur user charges
(left-hand) or not (right-hand). Quasi-markets remain in the “all public”
sector - they introduce an element of competition between public
providers, but finance and decision-making remain in the hands of
public agents.
The outer ring shows mechanisms which are used to deliver
welfare where the consumer has decision-making power. Vouchers are
one such mechanism, for example, the now-defunct nursery vouchers.
Under the scheme, the government financed nursery education for 4-
year olds, but allowed individual parents to choose the provider of the
nursery place and to add to the value of the voucher if necessary. This
would therefore be outer ring (private decision), right-hand side (public
finance) and either in the top or bottom sector, depending on whether
the parent chose an LEA or a private nursery. The ability to ‘top-up’ the
value of the voucher is significant, since it is likely to affect supplier
behaviour and allows consumers to trade up. Knowing that parents may
be willing to pay more for a higher-quality service, nurseries will
compete on that basis. If vouchers could not be supplemented, the price
element of competition would be removed, and nurseries hoping to
attract voucher-bearing parents would have to charge a fixed amount.
The second way in which this typology may be helpful is in
allowing us to depict welfare policy under successive governments as
moving out from the “all public” sector in different directions. This is
explored in greater depth in the second part of the paper, but Chart 4
provides a thumb-nail sketch. We can think of the underlying
Conservative policy objective as being to minimise the importance of the
“all public” sector which represented everything they stood against:
state-owned monopolies, big demands on the public finances, and lack
of individual choice. The early 1980s saw moves towards outright
privatisation - moving out from the “all public” (white sector) into the
“all private” (black). Selling off council houses under Right-to-Buy is
perhaps one of the most best-known examples. But by the late 1980s,
other ways of minimising the “all public” sector were being explored,
with an increased emphasis on user charges (moving left in the inner
circle) and on contracting-out (moving down into the left and right inner
circle sectors). Some public bodies were also encouraged to market their
services, for example, pay-beds in NHS hospitals (increasing the
importance of the top left outer ring). These moves restrict the role of the
state to either purchaser or provider, but not both. Finally in the 1990s,
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we have seen a concern with “agency” - directly, by giving consumers
decision-making power in the form of vouchers (moving into the right
hand outer ring), and indirectly, by creating incentive structures in
public organisations which encourage employees to act as agents on
behalf of consumers (a sub-division of the white sector).
3. Changing patterns of expenditure, 1979/80-1995/96
In this section, the typology developed above is used to analyse changes
in expenditure on welfare. The colour charts compare spending in five
main areas - education, health, housing, social security and personal
social services - in 1979/80 and 1995/96. Of course, expenditure is not
equivalent to outcome: a greater proportion of total expenditure being
spent in one area does not necessarily mean more “welfare” is produced,
or even more units of service provided. The “snapshot” approach also
has limitations - it cannot show when changes took place and there is a
danger that one or other year is atypical - and for this reason the main
charts are supplemented with figures giving time series on provision or
expenditure where possible.
Other limitations are imposed by the data, as detailed in the
Appendix. In general, the charts should be taken as illustrative rather
than exact to the last decimal place - the necessity of using data from
many different sources and the fact that administrative and household
expenditure data do not tend to be broken down in the categories used
here mean that some estimates have to be made.
Education
The change in pattern of current expenditure on education between
1979/80 and 1995/96 is illustrated in Chart 5.
Whether state schooling should be classified as inner or outer ring
is a mute point. The last two Conservative governments sought to
promote “parental choice” in education, in particular by allowing
schools to “opt-out” of Local Education Authority (LEA) control.3 While
these institutions have a greater degree of budgetary discretion than
their LEA counterparts, they remain within the public sector, so this
policy can be seen as an attempt to move some state schooling from the
                                               
3 See for example the Foreword in DfEE (1996b).
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white “all public” sector into the orange “state provision but private
decision” sector.
However, the success of this policy is arguably limited. Parents
can now - at least in theory - choose between an LEA-controlled and an
opted-out school. State primary and secondary education have
effectively become voucher schemes without top-ups: parents may
‘spend’ their ‘voucher’ by sending their child to any state school, but
they cannot purchase a place at a better school by paying more. What
has not changed is that entry is restricted geographically, so that in most
cases options are limited to one or two local schools. Private alternatives
- independent schools or educating the child at home - involve
considerably higher costs and cannot be considered as part of the same
market. The only marginal trade possible is additional private tuition,
which can be purchased in small amounts and added on at the end of
the school day or in the holidays, but the bulk of schooling still has to be
provided for. On balance, the practical constraints on parents’ decisions
probably outweigh the theoretical freedom they have, and state primary
and secondary education are placed in the inner circle in the chart.
On this basis, expenditure in the “all public” (white) sector is
dominant in both 1979/80 and 1995/96. In the earlier year, this
expenditure is consists mainly of local authority spending on primary,
secondary and special maintained schools, including sixth form colleges.
In 1995/96, government spending on grant-maintained schools is added.
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There appears to have been significant growth in “all private”
expenditure (black sector). However this may be a misleading
impression, since the only measure available for private expenditure on
education is a general one which includes fees for driving lessons, music
instruction and leisure courses, as well as private school fees and
university tuition fees. The growth in private expenditure may therefore
have come partly from those other sources. However some of the
growth will have come from private schooling: although the proportion
of pupils attending private schools has remained relatively constant,
school fees have risen faster than inflation (Figures 1 and 2). Some of the
increase may have come from the increasing proportion of students
whose tuition fees are paid privately: Figure 3 shows the trend for post-
graduates.
Figure 1 : Proportion of school pupils 
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Figure 3: Source of tuition fees, GB, 1980/1-1993/4                                                                      
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Figure 2: Private school fees, UK 1984-1996
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The Assisted Places Scheme was introduced in 1981, under which
parents whose children had been offered places at an independent
school could apply for means-tested assistance with school fees from
central government. This makes its appearance in the yellow sector
(public finance, private provision and decision) in the 1995/96 chart.
Although the number of places under the scheme grew from 5,300
initially to 34,000 by 1995/96 (DfEE, 1996c), expenditure remained
relatively insignificant. The scheme is now to be phased out by the
Labour government.
The government also provides financial assistance to diplomats
and service personnel posted abroad who wish to send their children to
private school. This expenditure should be added to the yellow sector,
but figures were not available.
The green sector represents government grants to independent
establishments such as music and ballet schools, City Technology
Colleges, further education colleges, polytechnics and universities. It
also includes local authority expenditure on non-maintained school fees.
Most of these fees are for children attending non-maintained special
schools whose placements are arranged by the LEA. This expenditure
therefore counts as inner circle, since the decision on provider and type
of service is made primarily by a public body rather than by the parent
or child.
Other items of expenditure which should theoretically be included
but for which data were unavailable or too small to appear, include
contributions for state school compulsory activities (cookery classes,
field trips, etc.) which would come into the purple sector, and parental
expenditure on state boarding schools, of which there are 37 in England
and Wales, which would appear in the red sector (publicly-provided
service, privately-financed, chosen by consumers). Nursery education,
student maintenance and expenditure on training are not included.
Overall, the picture in education is one of continuing dominance
of the “all public” sector, though with growth in the “all private” sector.
Hotly-debated reforms such as opting-out and the assisted places
scheme had relatively little impact, the former failing to move state
schools from inner circle to outer ring since geographical constraints
remain dominant in schooling decisions, and the latter affecting only a
small minority of pupils.
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Health
Changes in the pattern of expenditure on health are illustrated in Chart
6. As for education,  the “pure public” sector is dominant in both years.
The introduction of quasi-markets in the health service in 1991 does not
show up in these charts, since whilst quasi-markets affect internal
incentives, public provision and finance is retained and decisions are
made by agents acting on behalf of consumers (health authorities and
GPs) rather than by consumers directly. Services delivered through
quasi-markets therefore remain in the “all public” (white) sector.
“Pure private” expenditure on health grew from 9 per cent of total
expenditure in 1979/80 to 15 per cent in 1995/96. This figure is made up
of private medical insurance premiums (whether made by employers or
individuals) and out-of-pocket expenditure by consumers on private
medical services and goods. Figure 4 gives a time series for the number
of people covered by private medical insurance, confirming that PMI
coverage has continued to grow, although it flattened off in the recession
of the early 1990s. This is despite the introduction in 1989 of tax-relief on
PMI for people over 60. (The cost of tax relief appears in the yellow
sector). Figure 5 shows that the number of acute beds in private hospitals
has also grown.
Figure 4: Private medical insurance, 
UK, 1974-1995
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The “all public” and “all private” sectors together account for
about 80 per cent of total health expenditure in both years. The
remaining 20 per cent is mostly accounted for by public expenditure on
contracted-out services (green sector). This includes expenditure on GP
services and General Dental Services, since GPs and dentists are
formally self-employed and contracted to the NHS.
Contracting-out to private providers for both care services and
‘hotel’ services was encouraged from 1983 onwards, and by 1986,
hospitals were required to have “market-tested” non-clinical services
such as catering and cleaning. The green sector in 1995/96 therefore
includes a figure for laundry and catering services provided under
external contracts. At the same time, health authorities were urged to
buy operations from the private sector where this was cheaper, but this
expenditure has remained small relative to the whole NHS budget
(figures included in green sector for both 1979/80 and 1995/96).
Patient payments for NHS services appear in the blue and purple
sectors (blue for contracted-out services and purple for directly-
provided services). Charges represent the same proportion of total
health expenditure in 1995/96 as 1979/80, but this conceals several
changes over the period. Prescription charges have risen faster than
 Figure 5: Private acute hospital beds, UK, 1980-1995
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inflation, but the proportion of prescriptions exempt from charges has
also grown, and in 1994 stood at over 80 per cent. Overall, the
proportion of public expenditure on pharmaceutical services met by
patient charges has remained fairly constant (Figure 6).
NHS glasses were restricted in 1985 to certain groups (children,
students under 19, people on low incomes and users of certain complex
lenses). This moved some expenditure from the “all public” to the “all
private” sector. The following year, NHS glasses were replaced by
vouchers, enabling those groups to choose their spectacles, although the
value of the voucher was insufficient to buy most glasses. This moved
another slice of expenditure from the “all public” sector, this time into
the yellow sector (public finance for private provision and decision). In
1989, free sight tests and dental check-ups were limited to special groups
- a further move out of the “all public” sector.
Expenditure on services purchased privately from the NHS (pay-
beds), represented by the red cylinder, is a higher proportion of NHS
expenditure in 1995/96 than 1979/80, although the same proportion of
all health expenditure. Restrictions on pay beds in NHS hospitals
initially imposed by the 1974-79 Labour government were lifted by the
first Thatcher government and new pay beds were encouraged
 Figure 6: Patient charges as percentage of 
gross NHS expenditure, UK, 1974-1995
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(Papadakis and Taylor-Gooby, 1987). Figure 7 gives an impression of the
numbers of private patients in NHS hospitals over the period.
The “all public” sector remains dominant in health as in education,
but was a smaller proportion of total expenditure in 1995/96 than in
1979/80. Most of the growth was in “all private” expenditure - PMI and
out-of-pocket private health spending - but a yellow sector (private
provision, public finance, private decision) also made its appearance as
the result of tax relief on PMI for the over-60s (now abolished) and NHS
vouchers for glasses. Pay-beds (red sector) gained slightly in importance.
Housing
Changes in the pattern of expenditure on housing are presented in Chart
7. The methodology adopted to measure expenditure was to
approximate current rental value for all tenures and divide that between
the various sectors. Current rental value in theory reflects capital as well
as current expenditure; however, a number of estimates had to be made,
so the figures are approximate (for details of calculations, see
Appendix).
In contrast to education and health, the dominant sector is “all
private”. This is true in 1979/80 as well as 1995/96, and its share grows
between the two years. The “all private” sector is made up of rent paid
on privately-owned dwellings, imputed rents for owner-occupiers and
Figure 7: Private in-patients in NHS hospitals
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their spending on repairs and maintenance, net of support given by the
state to those tenures. The growth and dominance of this sector is not
surprising when we consider that at the beginning of the period, owner-
occupation accounted for just over half of all dwellings in Great Britain,
and by 1995, that share had risen to two-thirds (Figure 8).
Part of this growth was by means of the Right-to-Buy policy,
introduced in 1980. Under the scheme, local authority tenants of at least
three years’ standing gained the right to purchase the house or flat they
occupied, at a discounted price. Discounts started at 33 per cent of
market value, and rose by one per cent for each additional year of
tenure, up to a maximum of 50 per cent or £25,000. The conditions were
made more attractive in 1984 and again in 1986. The policy made home-
ownership financially possible for thousands of tenants, but was not
without its costs. An estimate of the annualised value of Right-to-Buy
discounts given is included in Chart 7 in the yellow sector, as state
support for private provision.
Owner-occupation is also supported by the state through
mortgage interest tax relief, which was available at both higher and basic
rates of tax in 1979. Successive cuts brought the relief rate down to 15
Figure 8: Change in Housing Tenure, GB, 1974-1995
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per cent in 1995, and the 1997 budget cut it by a further 5 per cent. The
financial cost of tax relief is included in the yellow sector in both the
1979/80 and the 1995/96 charts, and a time series is given in Figure 9.
Numerous attempts have been made to revitalise the private
rented sector, but with limited success. Rent restrictions, first introduced
at the beginning of the century were eased in the early 1980s, further
deregulated in 1988 for all new lettings, and again in 1993. As a result,
private rents have risen in real terms, although the proportion of
dwellings privately rented has begun to grow only recently. Largely as a
consequence, the Housing Benefit bill for private tenants has increased
substantially and is continuing to grow (Figure 10). The cost of Housing
Benefit for private rent is included in the yellow sector.
Expenditure on Housing Associations (HA) tenancies is placed in
the inner circle in Charts 7, because in most cases tenants are nominated
by the local housing authority, rather than themselves choosing to live
in HA properties. The decision is therefore public (inner circle), the
provider is non-public (bottom semi-circle), and the finance is either
Figure 9: Cost of mortgage interest tax relief, 
UK, 1974-1995
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private (rents: blue sector) or public (Housing Benefit and economic
subsidy4: green sector).
Renting from a Housing Association has grown in importance as a
tenure since the role of the Housing Corporation was expanded in 1974
and grants to Associations made more generous. HAs also benefited
from the voluntary transfer of stock from local authorities in the late
1980s and early 1990s, since they were not subject to the same spending
restrictions as councils.
Public renting has declined both in terms of volume and public
expenditure. Rising local authority rents have decreased the economic
subsidy to tenants while increasing  Housing Benefit. Rents paid for
local authority houses and flats appear in the purple, (public provision,
private finance, public decision) sector, and Housing Benefit and the
economic subsidy on local authority dwellings appear in the white, “all
public” sector.
In summary, housing differs markedly from education and health
in the balance of provision, although the direction of change is more
familiar - away from the “all public” sector into the “all private” and
other outer-ring sectors. The increased use of Housing Associations to
                                               
4 The economic subsidy is the difference between the “economic rent” for the property
and the rent actually charged, with various adjustments. Calculations were based on Sefton
(1997).
F igure 10: Housing Benefit Expenditure in real 
terms, GB, 1984-1995
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provide social housing shows up in the greater size of the green and
blue sectors.
Social security
Changes in patterns of expenditure in social security are shown in Chart
8. Housing Benefit, Income Support for Mortgage Interest, and Income
Support for residential care are excluded from these charts since they are
included in the housing and personal social services charts. Included
here are other state benefits (both means-tested and universal), pensions,
and private welfare insurance.
The proportion which is “all public” has risen by 9 per cent
between 1979/80 and 1995/96, driven partly by demographics and
partly by higher unemployment rates (Evans, forthcoming). This is not
to say that there have been no attempts to move out from the “all
public” sector. In a number of cases benefits have been cut back or
eligibility restricted - for example the numerous changes to
unemployment benefit, and the harsher test of disability for Incapacity
Benefit. Alternatives in the form of private insurance, for example
Permanent Health Insurance, do exist and have been encouraged with
tax breaks, but are expensive and not available to ‘high-risk’ groups, so
take-up is low (Burchardt and Hills, 1997). The Child Support Agency
was also an attempt to reduce the social security bill, by enforcing
maintenance payments from absent parents. Payments made through
the Child Support Agency to parents fall into the purple sector (public
provision, private finance, public decision), but are too small to appear
in the Chart.
Perhaps the most interesting developments in social security as far
as public and private boundaries are concerned have taken place in the
provision of pensions, and expenditure on pensions is therefore
illustrated separately in Chart 9.
Pensions expenditure can be measured either in terms of pensions
in payment or in terms of contributions currently being made towards
future pensions. The latter approach is adopted here, with the exception
of the basic state pension, which, being unfunded, is measured as the
cost to the taxpayer of the pensions paid to today’s elderly population. A
further difficulty arises over the treatment of tax reliefs.5 Although tax
relief is given on pension contributions and (until the recent Budget) on
assets accruing to pension funds, regular pension income - the result of
                                               
5 For a thorough examination, see Hills (1984).
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contributions and interest on the fund - is taxable. So tax relief on
contributions and pension funds can be seen as merely deferring
taxation. However, in some cases pension income is taxed only at the
basic rate whilst contributions attracted relief at the higher rate, and in
all cases, lump sum pension payments received on retirement are tax-
free. Moreover, taxing the outcome of fund growth has a different effect
from taxing interest on the fund as it accrues. The cost of these
anomalies must be treated as a genuine tax expenditure (for details of
estimates, see Appendix).
In 1979/80, “pure public” expenditure on pensions, in other words
the cost of the basic state pension, was 40 per cent of total pension
expenditure. This rose to 44 per cent in 1995/96, even though pensions
have been up-rated in line with prices rather than earnings since 1980.
The second-tier state pension scheme (SERPS), paid for through
National Insurance contributions and general taxation, was introduced
in 1975. By 1979/80, it accounted for 14 per cent of pensions
expenditure. However, in 1986 it was cut back and opting out from the
scheme was encouraged. The Government anticipated that between half
and one million people would leave SERPS, but in fact the incentives
were more effective: nearly five million people opted out (Dean, 1993).
By 1995/96, SERPS represented only 6 per cent of total expenditure on
pensions.
SERPS contributions are placed in the orange sector, since,
although contributing to a second-tier pension is compulsory for all
employees, individuals may choose whether to remain in the state
scheme or opt out by means of an occupational pension, or, more
recently, a personal pension. SERPS is therefore public finance and
provision but private decision.
From the outset, members of occupational pension schemes could
opt out of SERPS and get a National Insurance rebate of 5.4 per cent,
provided the occupational scheme guaranteed a minimum pension to
match the state scheme. In 1986, the contracted-out rebate was increased
to 5.8 per cent, and money-purchase schemes were admitted alongside
final salary schemes. The result is dual-financing for occupational
schemes: part is effectively public finance in the form of National
Insurance rebates (and tax reliefs), and part is private finance -
contributions by employers and employees. Expenditure on
occupational schemes is therefore distributed between the yellow and
black sectors in Chart 9.
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From 1987, people with recognised personal pensions were also
permitted to opt out of SERPS. Rebates on National Insurance
contributions were paid directly into the personal pension and special
incentive payments were made by the Department of Social Security (2
per cent of reckonable earnings  up to 1993, and, for people aged over
30, 1 per cent for the next five years). Financing for personal pensions is
therefore also split between the yellow and black sectors. The self-
employed are not eligible for National Insurance rebates, since they are
not part of SERPS, but may contribute to a personal pension. Their
contributions are included in the black sector.
The black sector remains more or less constant in proportionate
size, but the yellow sector grows appreciably. This suggests that
contributions to occupational and personal pensions over and above the
value of the contracted-out deduction have remained constant, while
incentive payments, rebates and tax reliefs have grown. Nearly two-
thirds of the reduction in the proportion of total expenditure going on
SERPS contributions re-appears as public finance for private provision
(the yellow sector).
Figure 11 shows changes in the numbers of contributors to SERPS,
occupational pension schemes and appropriate personal pension plans
over time. SERPS membership falls away,  the number of contributors to
occupational schemes remains constant, and the number of people
contributing to a personal pension grows steadily from 1987 to 1992 but
subsequently levels off.
Figure 11: Contributors to pension 
schemes, UK, 1986/7-1994/5
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Personal social services
Changes in patterns of expenditure on personal social services are
illustrated in Chart 10. Unfortunately, appropriate breakdowns of
expenditure, especially private expenditure, were not always available,
and the “black sector” figure is an under-estimate in both years.
Comparison with aggregate figures suggests that in 1995/96 the green
sector may be over-estimated at the expense of the white sector - see
Appendix for details.
Although the size of the shift may be exaggerated in the Charts,
there can be little doubt that there has been a re-allocation of
expenditure from “pure public” expenditure (70 per cent of the 1979/80
total) to contracted-out expenditure (green sector: up from 11 per cent to
34 per cent in 1995/96). This is largely due to changes in residential care
provision (Figure 12). Placements in local authority residential homes
were discouraged in favour of private and voluntary care homes by the
system of funding places in private and voluntary care homes through
Supplementary Benefit/Income Support in the 1980s. At the same time,
elderly people who would previously have been cared for in long-stay
NHS geriatric wards were moved into private nursing homes, paid for
by the NHS or by Income Support. In April 1993, responsibility for
funding long-term care passed to local authorities, who were required to
pay the fees (up to a limit) of any elderly person assessed as needing
care who passed the means test. A high proportion - over 60 per cent - of
residents of independent care homes are supported by the state in some
form (Laing and Buisson, 1995).
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Figure 12: Long-Term Care places by 
sector, England, 1983-1994
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The increase in the blue sector (private provision, private finance,
public decision) and the decrease in the purple sector (the same but
public provision), are largely consequences of the switch from local
authority to private provision of residential care. Frequently, fees paid
by the local authority are insufficient to meet the costs of a placement,
either because the client has been assessed as being able to make a
contribution, or because the fees charged by the particular care home are
above the local authority’s normal limit. The difference, met by the client
or his/her relatives, appears in the blue sector.
Expenditure by entirely self-financing elderly residents of private
care homes - who perhaps have savings above the limit for the means-
test or who require a residential placement in the authority’s assessment
- appears in the black, “all private” sector. Accurate figures are hard to
obtain;  the 1979/80 figure is estimated from a number of sources and
assumes, amongst other things, that care home fees for self-payers are
not higher or lower than average care home fees. There are self-
financing residents of care homes who are not elderly (those with
physical or mental disabilities, or those who are chronically sick or
mentally ill), but no estimates were available for their expenditure.
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In non-residential care, the major changes came about as a result of
the Griffiths report and the subsequent White Paper, Caring for People
(DoH and DSS, 1989). This introduced the purchaser/provider split,
encouraging local authority social services departments to contract with
private or voluntary sector service providers (moving from the “all
public” sector to the green sector), whilst remaining responsible for
assessing needs and ensuring they were met. But private provision
remains patchy, with few companies willing to take on the low-intensity
care required by many people. Local authorities have also been
encouraged to charge for their services on a means-tested basis, and the
proportion of expenditure which is recouped through user charges has
grown for some services. This contributes to the growth in the blue
sector.
Informal care is not included in the charts because of the
difficulties in placing a monetary value on the time and energy
expended by unpaid carers. Laing and Buisson’s (1995) estimate of
£41,000 million in 1994/5 was arrived at by valuing informal care at
£7.00 per hour, but estimates will vary widely depending on the figure
used. It is clear, however, that the number of hours of care provided
informally dwarfs formal provision, and any decline in the availability
of informal carers is likely to result in increased pressure on formal care
services.
The most substantial moves in personal social services have been
from public to private providers, but decision-making has remained
centralised, with social workers compiling care packages on behalf of
most clients. The purchaser/provider split has perhaps been taken
further in social services than in some other areas of welfare, but  moves
from inner circle to outer ring have been less prominent. The “all
private” sector probably plays a growing but still small role, although
data on expenditure are scarce.
All welfare expenditure
The expenditure charts for each of the areas of welfare are combined in
Chart 11. The picture which emerges is one of perhaps surprising
constancy - with “pure public” expenditure remaining dominant in both
years. However its share of total expenditure does fall from 54 per cent
to 49 per cent. Most of the difference is picked up by a growth in the
“pure private” sector, which rises from 25 per cent to 29 per cent. Public
finance for private provision is the next most important sector overall:
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the yellow and green sectors between them account for 14 per cent and
19 per cent of expenditure in 1979/80 and 1995/96 respectively. The
growth is more due to contracting-out than it is due to tax-reliefs and
other “privately decided” mechanisms. The orange sector (public
provision and finance, private decision) falls from 5 per cent to 1 per
cent, and this is driven by the demise of SERPS. Other sectors remain
more or less constant between the two years.
4. Conclusion
This paper has presented a typology of welfare services and attempted
to illustrate its use in policy analysis and, in particular, in clarifying
discussions about the privatisation of welfare.
A third dimension was added to the now-traditional provision and
finance classification. This third dimension concerns the extent of the
consumer’s decision-making power, and turns on the question of agency
and exit. Services were held to be privately-decided (outer ring on the
charts) where consumers made decisions directly and had a range of
providers offering a range of qualities of service to choose between.
In the second half of the paper, the third dimension was found to
be increasingly important in policy terms. In education, Grant
Maintained schools were an attempt to move state education out from
the “all public” sector into the privately-decided sector. The assisted
places scheme and short-lived nursery vouchers were likewise attempts
to promote consumer decision-making. Parallel polices in health were
small scale, though much discussed, for example NHS glasses vouchers
and tax relief for PMI. Out-right privatisation took place with the
withdrawal of free dental check-ups and eye-tests for most groups,
while the encouragement of pay-beds was an attempt to market state
services privately. Housing started with a larger “all private” sector than
either education or health, and this dominance was cemented through
the Right-to-Buy policy. State support for owner-occupation continued
by means of MIRAS. In the rented sector, Housing Benefit took the place
of subsidy for social housing and regulation of private rents. Finally in
the area of pensions, incentives to opt-out of the state scheme were
increased, and resulted in a sharp increase in contributors to  personal
pension plans.
Despite the policy interest in moving from public to private
decision, the impact was often small in terms of expenditure.
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Contracting-out to the private providers became more important but the
level of public finance for individuals who themselves chose private
providers remained at 10 per cent of total expenditure. Entirely private
welfare was the second largest sector in both 1979/80 and 1995/96, and
grew slightly over the period to 29 per cent of total expenditure. But the
overall picture in terms of expenditure is one of continuing importance
of the publicly provided, financed and decided sector: just over half of
all expenditure in 1979/80 and just under half in 1995/96. It may be that
it is more problematic in practice to devolve decision-making power to
the level of consumers in the area of welfare than some policy-makers
would like to assume.
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Appendix
EDUCATION
All figures are for England in 1995/6 £million (GDP deflated), unless otherwise stated
General notes
1.  Does not include training or pre-school education expenditure
2.  Does not include student maintenance grants
3.  Current expenditure only
Amount in Amount in
Colour Category Description 1979/80 1995/6 Notes
White Public provision,
finance and decision
State primary and
secondary schools
9776 11128 Local authority current expenditure. Includes 6th
Form Colleges in 1979/80.
Special schools 600 973 Local authority current expenditure.
Grant-maintained
schools
1643 Central government grant and local authority
current expenditure.
Meals & transport 1344 Local authority current expenditure. Assumed to
be public provision in 1979/80.
Teachers centres,
child guidance &
pupil support
514 Local authority current expenditure. Not
separately identifiable in 1979/80.
Miscellaneous 1045 1434 Local authority and central government current
expenditure. Includes research , administration
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and inspection.
TOTAL 12764 15692
TOTAL (UK) 15317 18830 England totals multiplied by 1.2.
Percent of grand total 65.5% 52.4%
Orange Public provision and
finance, private
decision
0 0
TOTAL 0 0
Percent of grand total 0.0% 0.0%
Purple Public provision,
private finance, public
decision
0 0
TOTAL 0 0
Percent of grand total 0.0% 0.0%
Red Public provision,
private finance,
private decision
TOTAL 0 0
Percent of grand total 0.0% 0.0%
Green Private provision,
public finance and
decision
Non-maintained
school fees
330 197 Local authority current expenditure. In 1979/80
includes teachers centres, child guidance and
pupil support.
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City Technology
Colleges
53 Central government expenditure
Voluntary, non-
maintained special,
music & ballet
schools
113 114 Central government grants.
Meals & transport 803 Local authority current expenditure. Assumed to
be contracted-out in 1995/6.
Higher and further
education
4120 6342 Local authority and central government grants to
institutions. Includes teacher training.
TOTAL 4563 7509
TOTAL (UK) 5476 9011 England totals multiplied by 1.2.
Percent of grand total 23.4% 25.1%
Yellow Private provision,
public finance, private
decision
Assisted places
scheme
104 Central government expenditure
Higher and further
education
566 1365 Local authority and central government
expenditure on tuition fees. Includes teacher
training.
TOTAL 566 1469
TOTAL (UK) 679 1763 England totals multiplied by 1.2.
Percent of grand total 2.9% 4.9%
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Blue Private provision and
finance, public
decision
0 0
TOTAL 0 0
Percent of grand total 0.0% 0.0%
Black Private provision,
finance and decision
Consumer
expenditure
1592 5301 Includes university tuition fees, private school
fees, fees for private tuition and leisure courses. In
1979/80, also includes local authority school
charges for education, which should be in purple
category.
TOTAL 1592 5301
TOTAL (UK) 1910 6361 England totals multiplied by 1.2.
Percent of grand total 8.2% 17.7%
All GRAND TOTAL 19485 29971
Percent 100% 100%
GRAND TOTAL
(UK)
23382 35965 England totals multiplied by 1.2.
Sources:
DES (1982) Education Statistics for the UK 1982
DfEE (1996a) Education and Training Expenditure since 1979/80, Statistical Bulletin 5/9
DfEE (1997) Education Statistics for the UK 1996
DfEE & OFSTED (1996c) The Government's Expenditure Plans 1996/7 to 1998/9
Glennerster (forthcoming) "Education : reaping the harvest?"
ONS (1996a) Consumer Trends Q4 1996
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HEALTH
All figures are for UK in 1995/6 £million (GDP deflated), unless otherwise stated
Amount in Amount in
Colour Category Description 1979/80 1995/6 Notes
White Public provision,
finance and decision
NHS hospital and
community services
14820 25845 Net of NHS patient charges, private patients'
payments, acute medical care purchased by NHS
and, in 1995/6, contracted out laundry and
catering
Misc. NHS
expenditure
2988 5478 eg central administration costs, ambulance
services, mass radiography, laboratory,
vaccination, research & development
General ophthalmic
services
154 Sight tests and dispensing paid out of public
funds. Assumed to be all public provision in
1979/80.
TOTAL 17962 31323
Percent of grand total 70.5% 62.9%
Orange Public provision and
finance, private
decision
0 0
TOTAL 0 0
Percent of grand total 0.0% 0.0%
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Purple Public provision,
private finance,
public decision
NHS hospital
charges
119 228 Patient payments for supply and repair of
appliances, drugs, amenity beds. Not including
private patients in NHS hospitals.
General ophthalmic
services
85 Patient payments for sight tests and dispensing.
Assumed to be public provision in 1979/80.
TOTAL 204 228
Percent of grand total 0.8% 0.5%
Red Public provision,
private finance and
decision
NHS private patients 98 233 "Pay-beds"
TOTAL 98 233
Percent of grand total 0.4% 0.5%
Green Private provision,
public finance and
decision
General dental
services,
prescriptions, general
medical services
4586 9153 Paid out of public funds. Assumes no patient
charges for general medical services (eg GPs)
General ophthalmic
services
112 Sight tests. Assumes all privately provided in
1995/6.
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Contracted-out care 77 51 In 1979/80: NHS expenditure on "contractual
homes and hospitals" (grossed up from England
& Wales figure); in 1995/6: Laing & Buisson
estimate of acute health care purchased from
independent sector.
Catering and laundry 109 Contracted-out laundry and catering contracts
(grossed up from England figure). Not available
for 1979/80.
TOTAL 4663 9425
Percent of grand total 18.3% 18.9%
Yellow Private provision,
public finance,
private decision
Glasses voucher
scheme
166
Private medical
insurance
86 Cost of tax relief on PMI for over-60s
TOTAL 0 253
Percent of grand total 0.0% 0.5%
Blue Private provision and
finance, public
decision
General dental
services &
prescriptions
331 821 Patient charges. Includes patient charges for
services not detailed elsewhere.
TOTAL 331 821
Percent of grand total 1.3% 1.7%
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Black Private provision,
finance and decision
Over-the-counter
medicines, spectacles
and contact lenses
1563 4285 Consumer expenditure, excluding NHS charges
Private medical
insurance
323 2059 Premiums (whether paid by employer or self), net
of tax relief in 1995/6
Other private
medicine
344 1136 Consumer expenditure on private medical,
dental, optical and nursing fees. Excludes NHS
payments, PMI, purchase of medicines or other
goods.
TOTAL 2231 7481
Percent of grand total 8.8% 15.0%
All All GRAND TOTAL 25488 49764
Percent 100.0% 100.0%
Sources
CSO (1981) Annual Abstract of Statistics 1981
CSO (1982) Family Spending: A report on the 1980 Family Expenditure Survey
CSO (1983) Family Spending: A report on the 1981 Family Expenditure Survey
House of Commons Health Committee (1995/6b) Public Expenditure on Health and Personal Social Services, HC 698
House of Commons (1980/1) National Health Service Summarised Accounts 1979/80, HC 312
Laing & Buisson (1996) Laing's Review of Private Healthcare
OHE (1995) Compendium of Health Statistics
ONS (1996a) Consumer Trends Q4 1996
ONS (1997) Annual Abstract of Statistics 1997
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HOUSING
All figures are for UK in 1995/6 £million (GDP deflated), unless otherwise stated
General notes
1.  Method is to distribute current rental value of all dwellings between the various categories.
2.  Minor tax reliefs, eg rent-a-room scheme, not included.
3.  Effect of rent controls on private properties not included.
4.  LA = local authority; HA = Housing Association
Amount in Amount in
Colour Category Description 1979/80 1995/6 Notes
White Public provision,
finance and decision
Housing Benefit for
LA tenants
1854 5562 Rent rebates in 1979/80.
Economic subsidy
for LA tenants
4782 1817 Economic subsidy calculated according to method
in Sefton (1997)
Homelessness
provision
42 Public provision. Grossed up from England figure.
Not identified separately in 1979/80.
TOTAL 6636 7421
Percent of grand
total
18.0% 10.4%
Orange Public provision and
finance, private
decision
0 0
TOTAL 0 0
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Percent of grand
total
0.0% 0.0%
Purple Public provision,
private finance,
public decision
LA rents 3346 2638 Net of Housing Benefit
TOTAL 3346 2638
Percent of grand
total
9.1% 3.7%
Red Public provision,
private finance and
decision
0 0
TOTAL 0 0
Percent of grand
total
0.0% 0.0%
Green Private provision,
public finance and
decision
Housing Benefit for
HA tenants
183 1100 Rent allowances in 1979/80.
Economic subsidy
for HA tenants
142 380 Assumes economic subsidy is same proportion of
rent per dwelling as for LA dwellings, calculated
following method in Sefton (1997)
Homelessness
provision
166 Bed & Breakfast accommodation and private
leasing. Not identified separately in 1979/80.
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TOTAL 325 1646
Percent of grand
total
0.9% 2.3%
Yellow Private provision,
public finance,
private decision
Mortgage Interest tax
relief
4200 2800
Income Support for
Mortgage Interest
100 1100
Housing Benefit for
private rents
517 4300
Right-to-Buy
discount
1300 Annualised value, following method in Sefton
(1997). 1993 figure GDP deflated.
TOTAL 4817 9500
Percent of grand
total
13.0% 13.4%
Blue Private provision
and finance, public
decision
HA rents 341 1100 In 1979/80, estimated from number of HA tenants
and average fair rent. Net of Housing Benefit.
TOTAL 341 1100
Percent of grand
total
0.9% 1.5%
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Black Private provision,
finance and decision
Owner-occupiers'
imputed rents &
spending on repairs
& maintenance
18800 44200 Net of MIRAS, ISMI and, in 1995/6, annualised
RTB discount
Private rents 2660 4600 Net of Housing Benefit
TOTAL 21460 48800
Percent of grand
total
58.1% 68.6%
All All GRAND TOTAL 36925 71105
Percent 100.0% 100.0%
Sources
CSO (1980) United Kingdom National Accounts: The Blue Book
DoE (1996a) Local Government Financial Statistics 1996
DoE (1996b and previous years) United Kingdom Housing and Construction Statistics
DSS (1996 and previous years) Social Security Statistics
Hills (forthcoming) "Housing: a decent home within the reach of every family"
ONS(1996c) United Kingdom National Accounts: The Blue Book
ONS (1996b) Regional Trends
Sefton (1997) The Changing Distribution of the Social Wage
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SOCIAL SECURITY
All figures are for UK in 1995/6 £million (GDP deflated), unless otherwise stated
General notes: See separate table for details of pension calculations
Amount in Amount in
Colour Category Description 1979/80 1995/6 Notes
White Public provision,
finance and decision
Expenditure on basic
state pension
23489 29782 Including non-contributory pension, widows
pensions and Christmas bonus.
Other social security 23335 46187 Grossed up from GB figure. Excluding pension,
Housing Benefit, Income Support for Mortgage
Interest and Income Support for residential care,
as these all included elsewhere.
Child Support
Agency
48 Payments to Secretary of State for benefits repaid.
Grossed up from GB figure.
TOTAL 46824 76017
Percent of grand total 57.2% 66.1%
Orange Public provision and
finance, private
decision
SERPS contributions 7937 4009 Non-contracted out contributions which could
have been contracted-out. See pensions table for
details.
TOTAL 7937 4009
Percent of grand total 9.7% 3.5%
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Purple Public provision,
private finance,
public decision
Child Support
Agency
27 Payments to persons with care.
TOTAL 0 27
Percent of grand total 0.0% 0.0%
Red Public provision,
private finance and
decision
0 0
TOTAL 0 0
Percent of grand total 0.0% 0.0%
Green Private provision,
public finance and
decision
0 0
TOTAL 0 0
Percent of grand total 0.0% 0.0%
Yellow Private provision,
public finance,
private decision
Contracted-out
deductions,
incentives and tax
reliefs on pensions
11209 16434 See pensions table for details.
TOTAL 11209 16434
Percent of grand total 13.7% 14.3%
Blue Private provision and
finance, public
decision
0 0
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TOTAL 0 0
Percent of grand total 0.0% 0.0%
Black Private provision,
finance and decision
Occupational and
private pension
contributions
15820 17762 Net of tax reliefs and contracted out deductions.
See pensions table for details.
Private "welfare"
insurance
89 681 Permanent Health Insurance, plus Mortgage
Payment Protection in 1995/6.
TOTAL 15909 18443
Percent of grand total 19.4% 16.0%
All All GRAND TOTAL 81879 114930
Sources
Association of British Insurers (1996) Insurance Statistics Yearbook 1985-1995
Child Support Agency (1996) Annual Report and Accounts, HC 466
DSS (1996) Social Security Statistics
Evans (forthcoming) "Social Security: dismantling the pyramids?"
House of Commons (1979/80) The Government's Expenditure Plans 1980-81 to 1983-84, Cm 7841
See also pensions table.
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PENSIONS
All figures are for UK in 1995/6 £million (GDP deflated), unless otherwise stated
General notes
1.  Method is to measure current contributions to pension provision.
2.  Since basic state pension is unfunded, this is measured as cost of pensions now in payment.
3.  Tax reliefs are calculated as, roughly, difference between current tax regime and a comprehensive income tax treatment, i.e. all
      higher-minus-basic rate relief, 25% of basic rate relief (to represent tax-free lump sums), and (1-basic rate) relief on fund income.
Amount in Amount in
Colour Category Description 1979/80 1995/6 Notes
White Public provision,
finance and decision
Basic state pension 23489 29782 Contributory and non-contributory retirement
pensions, widows pensions and Christmas bonus.
Grossed up from GB figures.
TOTAL 23489 29782
Percent of grand total 40.2% 43.8%
Orange Public provision and
finance, private
decision
SERPS 7937 4009 Proportion of contracted-in contributions which
could have been contracted-out. Grossed up from
GB figures.
TOTAL 7937 4009
Percent of grand total 13.6% 5.9%
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Purple Public provision,
private finance,
public decision
0 0
TOTAL 0 0
Percent of grand total 0.0% 0.0%
Red Public provision,
private finance and
decision
0 0
TOTAL 0 0
Percent of grand total 0.0% 0.0%
Green Private provision,
public finance and
decision
0 0
TOTAL 0 0
Percent of grand total 0.0% 0.0%
Yellow Private provision,
public finance,
private decision
Contracted-out
deduction for
occupational pension
6460 5829 Difference between full NI rate and contracted-
out rate.
Tax relief 4748 8535 Higher-minus-basic rate relief, plus 25% of basic
rate relief, plus (1-basic rate)*relief on fund
income.
Incentive payments
and rebates for
personal pensions
2070
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TOTAL 11209 16434
Percent of grand total 19.2% 24.2%
Blue Private provision and
finance, public
decision
0 0
TOTAL 0 0
Percent of grand total 0.0% 0.0%
Black Private provision,
finance and decision
Occupational
pensions
15295 13140 Employees and employers contributions, net of
tax relief and contracted-out rebates.
Personal pensions 525 4622 Net of tax relief and any incentives/rebates. In
1979/80: self-employed retirement annuities
"business in force" yearly premiums. In 1995/6
includes AVCs and employer contributions.
TOTAL 15820 17762
Percent of grand total 27.1% 26.1%
All All GRAND TOTAL 58455 67987
Percent 100.0% 100.0%
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Sources
Association of British Insurers: figures provided in response to personal inquiry
CSO (1989) United Kingdom National Accounts: The Blue Book
DSS (1996 and previous years) Social Security Statistics
DSS (1997) Pension Scheme Contributors 1986/7 to 1994/5
House of Commons (1981/2) National Insurance Fund Long term Financial Estimates, HC 451
House of Commons (1994/5) National Insurance Fund Long term Financial Estimates, HC 160
House of Commons (1995/6) National Insurance Fund Account 1994/5, HC 290
Inland Revenue (1996 and previous years) Inland Revenue Statistics 1996
Inland Revenue: figures supplied in response to personal inquiry
ONS (1996c) United Kingdom National Accounts: The Blue Book
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PERSONAL SOCIAL SERVICES
All figures are for England and Wales in 1995/6 £million (GDP deflated), unless otherwise stated
General notes
1.  Data for 1979/80 and 1995/6 collected under different headings, so not directly comparable.
2.  Local authority expenditure includes capital charges.
3.  By comparison with aggregate figures, green sector appears to be overestimated for 1995/6, and white sector underestimated.
Amount in Amount in
Colour Category Description 1979/80 1995/6 Notes
White Public provision,
finance and decision
Residential care 1216 1058 Local authority expenditure on own provision,
net of user charges. In 1979/80, assumes
residential care for "other groups" is all
publicly-provided. In 1995/6 calculated from
no. of own clients multiplied by average gross
cost per client less user charges.
Non-residential care 816 3296 Local authority expenditure on own provision,
net of user charges. In 1979/80, assumes
playgroups, intermediate treatment, day
centres & clubs, home helps, children & YP act,
sheltered housing is all own provision, and
assumes no charges for sheltered employment.
In 1995/6 assumes all intermediate treatment,
home care, and "other" services, are own
provision.
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Miscellaneous 917 532 Administration and regulation. In 1979/80
includes fieldwork. In 1995/6 includes capital
charges not included elsewhere.
Centrally-financed 31 32 eg training and research. Current expenditure.
TOTAL 2981 4918
TOTAL (UK) 3398 5607 England & Wales multiplied by 1.14
Percent of grand total 70.2% 41.1%
Orange Public provision and
finance, private
decision
0 0
TOTAL 0 0
Percent of grand total 0.0% 0.0%
Purple Public provision,
private finance,
public decision
Residential care 361 307 User charges for LA-provided services. Where
more precise information unavailable, total
user charges divided in proportion of all
clients in own-provision.
Non-residential care 51 163 User charges for LA-provided services. See
notes for residential care.
Miscellaneous 10
TOTAL 421 470
TOTAL (UK) 480 536 England & Wales multiplied by 1.14
Percent of grand total 9.9% 3.9%
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Red Public provision,
private finance and
decision
0 0
TOTAL 0 0
Percent of grand total 0.0% 0.0%
Green Private provision,
public finance and
decision
Residential care 262 2139 Local authority expenditure on contracted-out
services. In 1979/80, estimated as total net cost
minus cost of own provision. In 1995/6,
estimated as number of other-provision clients
multiplied by gross cost per client minus user
charges.
Non-residential care 183 363 See notes for residential care.
Income Support 22 1592 For residents of independent care homes.
TOTAL 467 4094
TOTAL (UK) 533 4667 England & Wales multiplied by 1.14
Percent of grand total 11.0% 34.2%
Yellow Private provision,
public finance,
private decision
0 0
TOTAL 0 0
Percent of grand total 0.0% 0.0%
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Blue Private provision and
finance, public
decision
Residential care 8 595 User charges for contracted-out services.
Where no better information available,
estimated as total charges multiplied by
proportion of all clients who are other-
provision clients.
Non-residential care 12 18 See notes for residential care.
TOTAL 20 613
TOTAL (UK) 23 699 England & Wales multiplied by 1.14
Percent of grand total 0.5% 5.1%
Black Private provision,
finance and decision
Residential and non-
residential care
354 1871 1979/80 estimate is for elderly residential care
only. 1995/6 estimate is for elderly, chronically
sick and physically disabled, residential and
non-residential care.
TOTAL 354 1871
TOTAL (UK) 404 2133 England & Wales multiplied by 1.14
Percent of grand total 8.3% 15.6%
GRAND TOTAL 4244 11966
Percent 100.0% 100.0%
GRAND TOTAL
(UK)
4838 13641 England & Wales multiplied by 1.14
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Sources
CIPFA (1981) Personal Social Services Statistics 1979/80 Actuals
CIPFA (1997) Personal Social Services Statistics 1995/6 Actuals
DHSS (1982) Health and Personal Social Services Statistics for England 1982
House of Commons Health Committee (1995/6a) First Report: Long-Term Care HC 19-111
House of Commons (1979/80) The Government's Expenditure Plans 1980-1 to 1983-4, Cm7841
DoH (1996) Department of Health Departmental Report, Cm 3212
Laing and Buisson (1995) Care of Elderly People Market Survey 1995
Laing and Buisson (1996) Laing's Review of Private Healthcare
ALL
All figures are for UK in 1995/6 £million (GDP deflated), unless otherwise stated
Amount in Amount in
Colour Category Description 1979/80 1995/6 Notes
White
Public provision,
finance and decision
Education 15317 18830
Health 17962 31323
Housing 6636 7421
Social Security 46824 76017
Personal Social Services 3398 5607
TOTAL 90137 139198
Percent of grand total 53.6% 48.7%
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Orange Public provision and
finance, private
decision
Education 0 0
Health 0 0
Housing 0 0
Social Security 7937 4009
Personal Social Services 0 0
TOTAL 7937 4009
Percent of grand total 4.7% 1.4%
Purple Public provision,
private finance,
public decision
Education 0 0
Health 204 228
Housing 3346 2638
Social Security 0 27
Personal Social Services 480 536
TOTAL 4030 3429
Percent of grand total 2.4% 1.2%
Red Public provision,
private finance and
decision
Education 0 0
Health 98 233
Housing 0 0
Social Security 0 0
Personal Social Services 0 0
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TOTAL 98 233
Percent of grand total 0.1% 0.1%
Green Private provision,
public finance and
decision
Education 5476 9011
Health 463 9425
Housing 325 1646
Social Security 0 0
Personal Social Services 533 4667
TOTAL 6797 24749
Percent of grand total 4.0% 8.7%
Yellow Private provision,
public finance,
private decision
Education 679 1763
Health 0 253
Housing 4817 9500
Social Security 11209 16434
Personal Social Services 0 0
TOTAL 16705 27950
Percent of grand total 9.9% 9.8%
Blue Private provision and
finance, public
decision
Education 0 0
Health 331 821
Housing 341 1100
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Social Security 0 0
Personal Social Services 23 699
TOTAL 695 2620
Percent of grand total 0.4% 0.9%
Black Private provision,
finance and decision
Education 1910 6361
Health 2231 7841
Housing 21460 48800
Social Security 15909 18443
Personal Social Services 404 2133
TOTAL 41914 83578
Percent of grand total 24.9% 29.2%
GRAND TOTAL 168313 285766
Percent 100.0% 100.0%
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Chart 1 Chart 2
Wheels of welfare
Bottom half: other
Top half: public
Top half:
public provision
Right half:
public purchase
Public provision
 and purchase
Public provision,
private purchase
Private provision
 and purchase
Private provision,
public purchase
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Chart 3
Wheels of welfare
 Inner circle: 
 public decision 
Right half:
public finance
          Top half:
public provision
eg publicly-provided services bought with vouchers
eg publicly-provided services paid for by user charges
eg contracted-out services paid for by consumer
KEY
eg "pure public" services; quasi-markets
eg contracted-out services purchased by the state
Inner circle
eg publicly-provided services bought by individuals
eg privately-provided services bought with vouchers, 
tax-reliefs or grants
eg "free market" services
Outer circle
Chart 4
Outright privatization
Contracting out
Marketing public services
User charges
Vouchers
KEY
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Chart 5: Expenditure on education
1979/80 1995/96
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Chart 6: Expenditure on health
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Chart 7: Expenditure on housing
1979/80 1995/96
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Chart 8: Expenditure on social security
1979/80 1995/96
9.7%
57.2%
13.7%
19.4%
3.5%
66.1%
14.3%
16.0%
67
13.6%
Chart 9: Expenditure on pensions
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Chart 10: Expenditure on personal social services
1979/80 1995/96
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Chart 11: Expenditure on welfare
1979/80 1995/96
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